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THE ECONOMIC GEOGRAPHY OF
FARM MORTGAGE DISTRESS—<1>-
LOCATIONOF AREAS OF FARM
MORTGAGE DISTRESS
THE main purpose of Part I is to describe geographical varia-
tions in farm mortgage distress between 1920and1940andto
relate the observed variations to general economic conditions
in different farming areas and to those characteristics of agri-
culture, such as type of farming, soil, topography, climate, and
location relative to markets, that affect farm earnings. Chapter i
takesup the problem of locating and mapping areas where
distress was either unusually heavy or notably less severe than
elsewhere. Later chapters will deal specifically with the mort-
gage experience in major agricultural areas, relating it to gen-
eral economic conditions and the physical factors affecting
productivity.
Indicators of Farm Mortgage Distress
In the broadest sense farm mortgage distress means much more
than foreclosure or forced sale. Sometimes mortgage distress is
evidenced by nothing more than mortgage delinquency, with-
out actual loss of the farm pledged as security. There may even
be distress without delinquency, appearing in the form of
lowered family living standards or badly run-down land and
buildings. Farmers have often had to "mine" their soil in order
to pay their mortgages. In our analysis, however, the chief
emphasis will be on those forms of distress evidenced by loss of
farm through bankruptcy, foreclosure, or assignment to creditors
in lieu of foreclosure, though other economic manifestations of
distress will be mentioned.
The several indicators to be used in locating agricultural areas
relatively subject to or free from debt difficulties are:(i)rec-
ords of distress transfers of farms, available for all states and
also for a 485-county sample taken throughout the country and
compiled by the Bureau of Agricultural Economics under a
Works Progress Administration project; (2) farm mortgage fore-
closures and losses reported by the federal land banks, the
Federal Farm Mortgage Corporation, and several of the major
insurance companies; thenumber of commercial bank26 AREAS OF DISTRESS
failures and the rate of decline in bank deposits; and (4) trends
in farm real estate values.
These data are diverse, which is a disadvantage in the sense
that there seems to be no feasible method of combining them
into an index of farm mortgage distress by counties, or even by
groups of counties. But the diversity is also an advantage be-
cause it provides broad evidence concerning farm economic
conditions. The loan experience of individual institutional
lenders is not necessarily representative of all lenders, nor is it
necessarily an accurate measure of the extent of farm mortgage
distress in an area. With several types of data, however, it is
possible to develop a reasonably good picture of farm mortgage
experience in various parts of the United States during the
interwar period.
Distress Transfers of Farms
The record of distress transfers is probably the most compre-
hensive single source of information concerning farm mortgage
difficulty. In the first place, these transfers include assignments
to creditors in lieu of foreclosure as well as actual foreclosures
and bankruptcies. In the second place, the record covers all
types of lenders, including individuals. Thus it contributes
greatly to the picture of debt distress in areas where the loans of
banks, insurance companies, and federal land banks were rela-
tively few.
The United States Department of Agriculture has compiled,
by states, annual distress transfer rates(distress transfers per
thousand farms) for 1925andsubsequent years.1 The data, to
be sure, have two obvious shortcomings: they do not cover the
early twenties, when considerable distress occurred in some
parts of the country; and the statewide units in which they are
available are often too large to show important geographical
variations. Despite their weaknesses, the statewide distress trans-
fer rates provide worthwhile information concerning trends in,
and the location of, farm mortgage distress during most of the
1 These materials are published, usually every other year, in The Farm Real
Estate Situation. The issues used for Figures 6 and 7, identified by USDA pub-
lication number and the years for which distress transfers are reported, are:
Circular No. 150 (1925-29), No. (1929-32), No. 354 No. 548 (1934.38),
and No. 662
The reporting years used by the Department of Agriculture end on March
15. Thus the year referred to as 1925 is the twelve-month period ending March
15,1926,and the period referred to as 1925-39 extends from March i6, 1925
through March 15,1940.AREAS OF DISTRESS 27
interwar period. For example, the annual averages for 1925-39
give a broad, general picture of geographical variations (Figure
6).
A further use of the statewide distress transfer rates is pos-
sible because they can be adjusted somewhat for variations in
the ratio of mortgaged farms to total farms that occurred from
state to state. Figure 7 shows estimated annual average distress
transfers, 1925-34, per thousand mortgaged farms.2 The adjusted
distress transfer rates imply somewhat worse experience in cer-
tain sections of the country than do the unadjusted rates. This
tendency is particularly noticeable in the Southeast, where the
ratio of mortgaged farms to total farms is low—largely because
of the census practice of counting cropper units as whole farms.
Since cropper units would not ordinarily be considered as whole
farms, the adjusted transfer rates undoubtedly give a more ac-
curate picture of mortgage conditions in the Southeast than do
the unadjusted rates. For other parts of the country, the
superiority of either set of distress transfer rates over the other
depends on point of view. If, for example, the emphasis is upon
the proportion of farmers who had financial difficulties in a
given state, the unadjusted rates are probably superior. If, how-
ever, the emphasis is upon the amount of difficulty experienced
by lenders, the adjusted rates are probably better.
Distress transfers were also tabulated under a Works Progress
Administration project from official records in 485 selected
counties.8 The period covered is 1935 and earlier years, and in
some counties records go back to 1900. In later chapters these
data will be used to show the trend of distress after 1900 in
selected areas. For the present purpose of locating trouble spots,
the number of distress transfers during 1920-35 expressed as a
percentage of the estimated number of mortgaged farms in 1930
is the measure used, because of its greater accuracy for the
Southeast and thus for regional comparisons.4 Variations in dis-
2Theestimates were obtained by dividing the annual average number of
distresstransfers per thousand farms in1925-34bythe estimated ratio of
mortgaged farms to total farms in 1930. The ratios of mortgaged farms to total
farms for each state, which are available only at five-year intervals beginning
with are contained in Farm-Mortgage Debt in the United States: 1945,
acooperative report by the Bureau of the Census and the Bureau of Agricultural
Economics, Table 2,page6.
8SeeTransfers of Farm Real Estate(Bureau of Agricultural Economics,
mimeo., August 1939).
4Informationon the total number of mortgaged farms by counties was not










































































































































































































































































































































































































































rAREAS OF DISTRESS 31
tress among the WPA sample counties are shown on that basis
in Figure 8. The map covers all counties for which distress
transfers were listed for every year from 1920 to 1935,inclusive,
and a few additional counties for which missing years could
easily be estimated.
Experience with Federal Land Bank Loans
Frequently it will be convenient to refer to the twelve federal
land banks merely as "land banks." The abbreviated term will
be applied only to them and will not include the so-called joint
stock land banks, which were established along with the federal
land banks under authority of the Federal Farm Loan Act of
1916 but were later liquidated by the Emergency Farm Mort-
gage Act of 1933.
The federal land banks started operations in 1917 with initial
capital entirely subscribed by the United States government.
Since they started in a period when credit from other sources
was comparatively easy to obtain, the volume of their loans
grew slowly, by the end of 1920 amounting only to $356 million,
or 31/2 percent of the total farm mortgage debt. With the
tightening of credit from other sources after 1920,thevolume
of land bank loans grew more rapidly; by the beginning of 1927
countydata on the number of owner-operated farms mortgaged. Also available
were statewide estimates, made by the Bureau of Agricultural Economics, of the
percent of tenant- or manager-operated farms mortgaged as well as the percent
of owner-operated farms mortgaged. From the combined information the per-
cent (X) of tenant- or manager-operated farms mortgaged in each county was
estimated by means of the proportion
% tenant- or manager-operated farms
X mortgaged in state
% owner-operated farms % owner-operated farms mortgaged
mortgaged in county in state
Adding, for each county, the number of tenant- or manager-operated farms
mortgaged (X percent of all farms) to the number of owner-operated farms
mortgaged gave the estimate for the total number of farms mortgaged in the
county.
While regional comparability is improved (through more accurate representa-
tion of the Southeast) by expressing distress transfers as a percentage of mortgaged
farms rather than of all farms, some noncomparability may nevertheless be
involved in using as the base year. In areas such as the western Great
Plains, where a substantial proportion of the 1920-35 foreclosures occurred before
1930 and thereby reduced the number of mortgaged farms in that year, the rate
of foreclosures would tend to be overstated in comparison with areas where
the majority of foreclosures occurred after 1930.32 AREAS OF DISTRESS
it aggregated slightly more than a billion dollars.5 Meanwhile
most of the capital originally subscribed by the government had
been paid back by farmer-borrowers who became stockholders
in the system, which is cooperative in character.°
In the early thirties, when economic conditions became criti-
cal, the lending operations of the land banks were very sub-
stantially curtailed by a shortage of loan funds that arose be-
cause certain classes of distressed assets, including acquired real
estate, were not eligible as security for land bank bonds. Since
the volume of real estate acquisitions was rapidly increasing
(the land banks acquired an average of roughly 9,000 farms a
year from 1932 to the end of the decade), it constituted a large
and continuing drain on resources available for lending. To
meet this situation the government subscribed additional capi-
tal, which permitted the banks not only to grant extensions of
time to deserving borrowers but also to undertake extensive
farm debt refinancing operations. In addition the land banks
became agents for direct governmental mortgage loans of an
emergency type known as Land Bank Commissioner loans. By
1937 land bank and Commissioner loans amounted to $2,889
million and constituted 39 percent of the total farm mortgage
debt.7
As farm incomes increased during World War II, mortgage
loan deliquencies and distress transfers of farm real estate de-
clined sharply. Farmers began to repay their loans at a greatly
increased rate and the financial position of the land banks
rapidly improved. In the fiscal year ending June 30, 1947the
last government capital was repaid and the banks became wholly
farmer-owned cooperative credit institutions.
Since the land banks loaned widely throughout the United
States, the geographical variations in their loan experience are
an important indicator of areas of farm mortgage distress. A
useful measure of where borrowers had difficulty is the "mor-
tality rate" of loans: that is, the percentage ratio of the volume
of real estate acquisitions and charge-offs within a certain group
5DonaldC. Horton, Harald C. Larsen, and Norman J. Wall, Farm-Mortgage
Credit Facilities in the United States(U.S. Department of Agriculture, Misc.
Pub. No. 478, 1942),Table2,p.12.
6 Incontrast to the federal land banks, the joint stock land banks had capital
originally provided by private subscription. Thus two types of land bank were
established under the Federal Farm Loan Act, one proprietary and the other
cooperative.
7Horton,Larsen, and Wall, op.cit., Table 2,p.12.AREAS OF DISTRESS 33
of loans to the total original amount of the loans. The Farm
Credit Administration has compiled information by county on
the amount of acquisitions(whether by foreclosure or by
voluntary deed), together with charge-offs, to 1939orlater for
all land bank loans made between 1917and1933.8Mortality
rates, calculated for groups of adjoining counties which in gen-
eral have similar physical, climatic, and type-of-farming char-
acteristics, are shown in Figure 9.
As a measure of where lenders had difficulty, loss rates serve
better than mortality rates. County to county variation.s in loss
rates on land bank loans made before 1933maybe observed in
Figure io. The areas of high mortality rates have also been, on
the whole, areas of high loss rates, but the correspondence is
not perfect. Losses are not necessarily proportional to the volume
of acquisitions(in which both foreclosed farms and farms
acquired by voluntary deed are included). Some acquisitions
eventually result in large losses, but others may result in no loss
at all or in gains. Actual loss experience is influenced by such
factors as practice in making and foreclosing loans, the amount
spent in acquiring, maintaining, and disposing of properties,
and the time of acquisition and sale in relation to trends in the
farm real estate market. The countrywide loss rate through
June 1946 on land bank loans made from 1917to1933 was 7.1
percent(Table 5). Among states the range was from no loss in
Rhode Island to 26.1 percent in Wisconsin.
Experience with Land Bank Commissioner Loans
Land Bank Commissioner loans, because they first became
available in i whenthe usual credit sources were drastically
curtailed, afford a unique chance to assess variations in experi-
ence on loans made in the worst part of the depression. Com-
missioner loans, which were direct financing by the federal gov-
ernment through the agency of the land could be made
on first or second farm mortgage security, whereas regular land
bank loans were restricted to first mortgages. Except for a con-
8Inreporting acquisitions and charge-offs, two banks had cut-off dates in 1939,
twoin 1941,onein 1942,onein 1943, and the remaining six in 1946.Foreclosures
after 1939onloans made before 1933wererelatively few and would not affect
the mortality rates significantly.
9TheFederal Farm Mortgage Corporation, wholly owned by the government,
was created in 1934toprovide funds for making Land Bank Commissioner loans
by the sale of government-guaranteed bonds. Commissioner loans previously
made were taken over by the corporation. Since July 1,1947 nonew Commissioner
loans have been made.36 AREAS OF DISTRESS
TABLE 5
Loss Rates through June 1946 on Federal Land
Bank Loans Made in
Region
and state Loss ratea
Region
and state Loss ratea
The Northeast Corn Belt states
Maine 9.8% Ohio i.0%
New Hampshire i.6 Indiana 4.0
Vermont 4.8 Illinois 2.0
Massachusetts 1.3 Iowa 4.6c
Rhode island b Missouri 10.1
Connecticut Lake states
New York 10.2 Michigan 9.6
New Jersey 4.0 Wisconsin 26.1
Pennsylvania 9.1 Minnesota u.o
1lppalachian states Great Plains
Delaware and Mounain states
Maryland 2.4 North Dakota 25.3
Virginia South Dakota 18.2c
West Virginia 3.5 Nebraska 6.2c









Cotton Belt states Wyoming i.oc
South Carolina 17.5 Colorado 9.7
Georgia io.q New Mexico 2.5
Alabama 3.6 Arizona .4
Mississippi Utah 8.7












Florida 16.2 California 2.5
United States 7.1%
From special tabulations of the Farm Credit Administration.
a Losses through June 30,1946on all federal land bank loans made from 1917
throughMay 1933, as a percentage of the amount loaned.
b In Rhode Island there was a gain of 0.3 percent.
CLossesare for the period January i, 1935 through June 30, 1946.
siderable number of good "prudent investment" loans made
on part-time farms in certain areas, the Commissioner first
mortgages were largely concentrated in situations considered
too risky for federal land bank loans. The Commissioner second
mortgages, which were usually junior to land bank first mort-
gages, were made on better land meeting the higher require-
ments of the land banks. For both first and second mortgages,AREAS OF DISTRESS 37
the total amount loaned, together with the prior lien in the case
of a second mortgage, could be as much as 75 percent of the
appraised normal value of the property (while regular land
bank loans were limited to about 50percent).There was a limit,
first put at $5,000andlater at $7,500,Ofl individualloans.
Since Commissioner loans were made on a second mortgage
basis and on comparatively risky first mortgage security, they
tended to bulk large in areas of distress and areas where other
sources of loans were limited. Although many of the Land
Bank Commissioner loans soon ran into repayment difficulties,
it was the government's policy to make every effort to avoid
actual foreclosures, and from 1933through1935therewere
very few. In 1936 the investment in farm real estate acquired
by the Commissioner increased somewhat and was equal to i
percentof the amount of loans outstanding at the beginning of
the year.1° By 1939theacquisition rate had increased to 4.5
percent. In 1940acquisitionsdeclined but still amounted to
2.8 percent of loans outstanding at the beginning of the year.
Loss rates on first mortgage Land Bank Commissioner loans
made from 1933through1935aregiven by state in Table 6.
The loans reported on, made when the refinancing program was
most active, represent about three-fourths of the $419million
total of Commissioner first mortgage loans made from 1933
throughmid-1946. Figureii showscounty variations in loss
rates on a special group of the loans covered by Table 6: those
whose amounts exceeded 65 percent of the appraised normal
agricultural value of the farm. The pattern of distress is similar
to that for the regular land bank loans, except for two notable
differences:(i)heavierCommissioner losses in the dust bowl
areas of western Kansas and adjoining states, and (2)smaller
Commissioner losses in areas of the Far West lying between the
two great mountain ranges, particularly in Idaho, Nevada,
Arizona, and the eastern half of Washington and Oregon.
Experience with Loans by
Life insurance Companies
Insurance companies have long been lenders in the farm mort-
gage field and before the twenties were second in importance
only to commercial banks. After 1910, loans of insurance com-
panies increased at about the same rate as the farm mortgage
10 Horton, Larsen, and Wall, op.cit., Table 42, p.121.38 AREAS OF DISTRESS
TABLE 6



























































From special tabulations of the Farm Credit Administration.
a Losses through June 30,1946on all Land Bank Commissioner first mortgage
loans closed from May 1933throughDecember asa percentage of the total
amount of the loans.
b Less than 0.05percentgain.
loans made by commercial banks, and by the end of 1920 they
totaled $1,206 million, or 12 percent of the total farm mortgage
debt.11 Insurance companies undoubtedly had losses in the
agricultural depression of 1921, although little information
about them is available. On the whole, however, their activities

























































F40 AREAS OF DISTRESS
cessful than those of commercial banks. After 1920, loans of
insurance companies continued to expand and by the end of
the decade their outstandings had about doubled. In the thirties,
when the depression became especially severe, insurance com-
panies foreclosed a large volume of their loans, and many of
the remaining loans were refinanced by the land banks and the
Land Bank Commissioner. Between 1929 and the end of 1937
insurancecompany farm mortgage holdings were reduced From
$2,139 million to $895 million, mainly as a result of foreclosures
and refinancing.
Because of the importance of insurance companies as lenders
their foreclosure experience is significant in the over-all picture
of farm mortgage distress. But the farm real estate loans of these
companies were not so widespread geographically as the loans
of commercial banks or of the federal land banks. The in-
surance companies tended to concentrate their business in the
Middle West, where a substantial volume of above-average-
sized loans could be made. At the beginning of 1930 the farm
mortgage loans held by insurance companies amounted to 22
percent of the total farm mortgage debt of the United States,
but the proportion varied widely in different parts of the
country, from practically no loans in the northeastern states to
overpercent of all mortgage loans in several of the mid-
western states (Table 7).
Unpublished data showing farm mortgage lending experi-
ence by counties as of the end of 1929 have been provided by
fourteen major insurance companies and as of the end of 1932
byfifteen companies. The farm mortgage loans held by these
companies amounted to about 6o percent of the total of such
loans held by all life insurance companies on the dates of report.
Areas where borrowers had difficulty can be located from the
insurance company data by means of a "distressed asset ratio,"
which is the percentage ratio of pending plus completed fore-
closures to total farm investment as of a given date. County to
county variations in the distressed asset ratios of reporting com-
panies are shown in Figure 12 for the end of 1929 and in Figure
13 for the end of 1932.12The1929 map is significant because
12Inthe construction of the maps drawn from life insurance company data
some cognizance had to be taken of counties where the number of loans was
small. As a rule, counties with only one loan were eliminated entirely. Counties
with, say, two to ten loans were also eliminated unless they could be consolidated
with contiguous counties having about the same number. Thus in peripheral


















































































From Distribution by Lender Groups of Farm-Mortgage and Reat Estate Hold-
ings, January x, 1930-45, by Harald C. Larsen (Bureau of Agricultural Economics,
mimeo., August 1945), Tables 17 and 22, pages 6o and 68. Based on data as of
January i.
a Less than 0.05 percent.
b Includes District of Columbia.
it shows areas where distress developed early in the interwar
period. Among them are a section of the eastern Cotton Belt and
a strip of territory running west from northwestern Minnesota
Share of Total Farm Mortgage Debt Held by
Life Insurance Companies, 1930
Share Share
of total of total
Region farm inort- Region farm mort-

























of counties rather than individual counties. Counties with few loans were never
consolidated with counties having numerous loans.AREAS OF DISTRESS 43
through North Dakota, Montana, Idaho, and eastern Oregon.
By the end of 1932, when economic conditions were approach-
ing their worst, the volume of pending and completed farm
mortgage foreclosures had increased substantially. At that time
one-fourth of the total farm investment of the reporting com-
panies was in acquired farms and in loans under foreclosure.
On the extent to which foreclosures resulted in loss to the
lender, the material provided by life insurance companies con-
cerns recovery experience with acquired farms sold by thirteen
firms from 1929 to 1937inclusive.For the United States as a
whole, receipts from sales amounted to 90.4 percent of total
costs to date of sale, indicating a loss rate of 9.6 percent on the
reporting companies' investment in acquired farms. Their ex-
perience, however, varied considerably from that average in in-
dividual states and counties. Discussion of the variations in loss
rates will be deferred until Chaptersand 4, which deal with
some of the areas where the insurance companies were espe-
ciafly active lenders.
Commercial Bank Data
Before the liquidation that began in the early twenties, com-
mercial banks were the largest holders of farm mortgage loans
among the institutional lenders. At the end of 1920 their loans
amounted to nearly $1.5billion,or about 14 percent of the
total farm mortgage debt.'3 But during the twenties, while
the insurance companies were almost doubling their portfolios,
the commercial banks lost ground as mortgage lenders. By 1931,
bank holdings of farm mortgages had declined to less than $i.o
billion and by the end of 1934 to about billion (Figure 4).
Direct evidence of area variations in foreclosures and loss
rates for commercial banks is not available, but considerable in-
direct evidence is provided by data on deposit changes and bank
failures. By their very nature, the operations of commercial
banks are certain to reflect the prosperity of the communities
in which they do business. Declining incomes and tightened
money conditions will quickly manifest themselves by deposit
withdrawals. If withdrawals continue, and if investment losses
are severe, bank failures are apt to result. The relationship be-
tween bank suspensions and distress farm transfers is indicated
13 Horton et al., op.cit., Table 2,p. 32.•
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inFigure 14.Stateswith a high rate of bank suspensions usually
had a high rate of distress transfers. Likewise there was, in the
main, a significant and direct relationship between distress
transfers and the shrinkage of bank deposits, as Figure 15shows.
To a small extent, of course, the two scatter diagrams reflect
the same thing, for the shrinkage of bank deposits represents
Figure14.Relation between Commercial Bank Suspensions,
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Bank Susper,son Rote
Distress transfer rote gives average annual foreclosures and assignments per thousand
mortgaged farms for each state; sec Figure 7. Bank suspension rate is the number of
commercial bank suspensions in1921-33, from Banking and Monetary Statistics (FRS,
1943, pp. 284 f.), given as a percentage of banks active in 1920 (from the annual report
of the Comptroller of the Currency for 1920: Table 105, pp. 857 ff., adjusted to exclude
mutual savings banks, Table 74, p. 816).
banksuspensions as well as deposit withdrawals from active
banks.
On a countrywide basis, farm mortgage debt held by com-
mercial banks during the interwar period was not large com-
pared to their other earning assets. At the end of 1920, when
the banks were the most important of the institutional lenders46 AREAS OF DISTRESS
Figure15. Relation between Change in Commercial Bank De-
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Percenfoge Change InBonk Deposits
Distress transfer rote gives overage annual foreclosures and assignments per thousand
mortgaged farms for each state; see Figure 7. Percentage changes in commercial bank
deposits were calculated from data for 1919 and 1934, June call dates, in Banking and
Monetary Statistics (FRS, 1943, pp. 24 ff.).
concerned,farm mortgage loans amounted to only .5 percent
of their total loans and discounts. In states where agriculture
is the principal industry, however, farm mortgage ioans con-
stituted a more important segment of bank earning assets: for
example, in North Dakota 14.2percent,in Minnesota 16.4 per-
cent, in Iowa 23.8 percent, and in Mississippi 26.4 percent.'4
Bank suspensions during the twenties were mainly in agri-
cultural areas (Figure i6). Concentration was heavy in a strip
running north to south from North Dakota and Minnesota to
eastern Texas. Georgia and South Carolina also had numerous
bank failures. After 1929,thevolume of suspensions increased
14 V. N. Vaigren and Elmer E. Engelbert, Far?n Mortgage Loans by Banks, In-
surance Companies, and Other Agencies (U.S. Department of Agriculture, Bul-































































































































..AREAS OF DISTRESS 49
rapidly and spread to many industrial areas. By the end of
1933, when the wave of failures had about subsided, the cumula-
tive number of bank suspensions for 192 1-33inclusiveamounted
to 50 percent of the state and national commercial banks active
on June 30, 1920.15Inthe industrial Northeast, where bank
failures were relatively few, the percentage of suspensions
ranged from iipercentin New Hampshire to 34 percent in
New Jersey. In the Far West, California had a relatively low
ratio of 19percent.States with exceptionally heavy suspension
rates included the following: Florida,iiopercent (evidently
some of the suspended banks were organized after1920);
Michigan, 87; South Dakota, 83; Iowa, Arkansas, 76; and
South Carolina, 73.
The pattern of deposit changes further highlights some of
agriculture's trouble spots. Deposit changes during the twenties
are shown in Figure 17. During the early thirties the decline
in deposits continued and spread (Figures 17 and i8). By the
end of 1933 deposits in most of the northern Great Plains, Iowa,
and Minnesota were less than half those of 1920. Similar shrink-
ages occurred in Arkansas, Georgia, eastern Oklahoma, South
Carolina, and scattered counties throughout the Mountain
region. Areas of relatively good economic conditions, indicated
by an increase in deposits between 1920 and the end of 1933,
showup in the northeastern states and western Texas. In areas
such as the Far West where branch banking is important, the
maps reveal mainly the experience of independent banks, since
deposits of branch banks are reported for the county in which
the head office is located. Possibly, experience in these areas
may have been more favorable than the maps indicate. In
thinly populated counties of the Mountain region the decline
of deposits to zero usually meant that there was only one bank
in the county, and it failed.
In analyzing the maps showing changes in deposits it is well
to realize that during the farm boom of 1919 and 1920,when
farmers borrowed heavily and agricultural prices were excep-
tionally high, there was a heavy flow of investment funds into
agricultural communities. Thus the decline of deposits in some
areas was a natural readjustment to more normal conditions.
Nevertheless, considerable hardships and distress resulted.
Fromthe source noted on Figure 14.:4
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Trends in Land Values
Indirect evidence of farm mortgage distress in the interwar
period is afforded by the Census of Agriculture estimates of
increases and decreases in land values by counties, the decreases
being particularly significant (Figures 19, 20, and 21). Land
values are the net result of numerous economic forces, including
the mortgage situation; and in turn land values exert a recip-
rocal effect upon the situation. When land prices in-
crease, mortgage debt eventually follows suit, thus setting the
stage for possible future trouble. If farm incomes later decline
substantially, some decrease in land values and some debt distress
will develop almost automatically. The decrease in land values
reduces loan security and operator equities; and any attempt by
lenders to protect their investments through foreclosure or
forced sale will merely aggravate the situation by driving prices
down further. In short, declines in land values are both a cause
and an effect of farm mortgage distress, and it is unlikely that
either will develop to any great extent without the other. Ex-
ceptions may occur in areas having a small amount of mortgage
debt. Even in a severe agricultural depression such areas might
experience considerable declines in land values without notice-
able mortgage distress. In general, however, farm mortgage
distress during the interwar period was most acute in the areas
in which land values declined the most (Figure 22).
From 1920 to 1930, decreases in farm real estate values were
greatest in the Southeast, the Corn Belt, the eastern Great
Plains, southeastern Oklahoma and northeastern Texas, and
scattered areas throughout the Mountain region (Figure ig).
Increases occurred in the Northeast, Florida, the western por-
tions of Texas, Oklahoma, and Kansas, and parts of California
and the western half of Washington and Oregon.
In the years between 1930 and 1935, which cover the worst
phase of the depression, oniy a few counties in the United States
escaped the deflation of farm property values (Figure 20). The
extent of the decline is indicated by the fact that nine-tenths of
the counties experienced decreases of 20 percent or more, and
values droppedpercent or more in over two-thirds of all
counties. Declines of 40 percent or more occurred mainly in
the western Corn Belt, South Dakota, Nebraska, and eastern
Oklahoma.
By 1935 many agricultural areas had begun to recover eco-
nomically. Reflecting this improvement, land value increasesAREAS OF DISTRESS 55
Figure22. Relation between Decline in Farm Real Estate Values,
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Percentage Decline in Value of Form Real Estate
Distress transfer rate gives overage annual foreclosures and assignments per thousand
mortgaged farms for each state; see Figure 7. Declines in value of farm land and buildings
were calculated from the index of the Bureau of Agricultural Economics in Agricultural
Finance Review, November 1952 (p.
weregeneral between 1935and1940lflthe Corn Belt, the
South, and the Mountain region, and along the west coast
(Figure 2 i). Exceptions were the northeastern and Great Plains
states. There the financial condition of farmers remained gen-
erally unfavorable through the late thirties.
Location of High and Low Distress Areas
A review of the foregoing maps showing variations in general
economic conditions, in over-all foreclosure experience, and
in foreclosure and loss experience reported by specific lenders
indicates considerable similarity in distress patterns. Thereare,
it appears, four, or possibly five, important farmingareas where
mortgage distress was very much worse than average, and there

























































































































































































































































































tAREAS OF DISTRESS 57
average (Figure 23). Of course variations occurred within these
broad areas, and in scattered counties (not indicated) mortgage
experience differed considerably from that of the area as a
whole. A brief description of the high and low distress areas
follows, summarizing the evidence in each case.
Great Plains: The northern and central plains area contain-
ing the Dakotas, most of Montana, Nebraska, Kansas, and the
eastern parts of Wyoming and Colorado is the most conspicuous
of all the trouble spots because of its geographical extent. All
the direct evidence heretofore considered—distress transfers,
insurance company foreclosures, and foreclosures and losses on
land bank and Commissioner loans_points to bad mortgage
experience in the Great Plains during the period under review.
In addition there is substantial indirect evidence in the form
of bank suspensions, decreases in bank deposits, and decreases
in land values.
Lake States:In the region bordering the western Great
Lakes, the area of poor experience covers most of Minnesota
and Wisconsin, and the northern part of Michigan that is con-
tiguous with Wisconsin. Distress transfers, insurance company
and land bank foreclosures, and especially land bank and Com-
missioner losses combine to show considerable mortgage dif-
ficulty there, as in the Great Plains. Decreases in land values,
however, were not so evident; northern Minnesota even showed
substantial increases from 1920to1930andfrom 1935 to 1940.
Southern Iowa and Northern Missouri: The rather small
distress area in the Corn Belt is important because its farming
is relatively intensive and there is a considerable concentration
of wealth. While the maps of distress transfers and of land bank
and insurance company foreclosures all indicate trouble, proba-
bly the most dramatic evidence is the loss experience both of
the life insurance companies (Figure 34, Chapter 3), which will
be discussed later, and of the land banks. There was also a great
deal of trouble, with serious losses, in northeastern Iowa.
Eastern Cotton Belt: The distress area in the eastern cotton
lands occupies most of Georgia and South Carolina with a little
of Alabama. Although the distress transfer maps do not clearly
delineate the area, its very poor mortgage experience shows up
plainly on the land bank and insurance company maps. More-
over, there were many bank failures, substantial declines in
bank deposits, and noticeable declines in real estate values.
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the central Cotton Belt, including Mississippi, Arkansas, eastern
Louisiana, and the eastern half of Oklahoma, is less of a trouble
area than any of those previously discussed, though experience
there was by no means good. The most definite evidence point-
ing to trouble in the central Cotton Belt was the experience with
land bank loans.
Suburban Northeast: Southern New England and sections of
New York and New Jersey within a hundred-mile radius of
New York city make up an area of very good.experience. Dis-
tress transfer rates were low, and the land bank experience was
good. Insurance companies made very few loans in the North-
east.
Central Corn Belt: Central Illinois and parts of central Indi-
ana and western Ohio had surprisingly good experience in
comparison with the rest of the Corn Belt. This is shown most
effectively on the loss rate maps for land banks and (as will
appear later) for life insurance companies (page 86). The maps
of land bank and insurance company foreclosure rates also indi-
cate better than average experience in the central Corn Belt.
Western Texas: Here the ranching and small grain areas of
the southern Great Plains are joined with the western end of
the Cotton Belt. But unlike the northerly sections of the Great
Plains and the easterly sections of the Cotton Belt, western
Texas had excellent farm mortgage experience, which is con-
spicuous on all the land bank and life insurance company maps.
The area is also noteworthy as one of the few sections of the
country that had substantial increases in land values during the
twenties. Of further interest is the small number of bank fail-
ures in western Texas.
Pacific Coast: Farm mortgage experience from southern Cali-
fornia to northwestern Washington was generally good. This is
confirmed by the distress transfer maps, insurance company
foreclosure rates, and land bank foreclosure and loss rates.
Increases in land values were general throughout the twenties.